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Abstract:
The emergence of varied ownership configurations in Estonia since privatization enables
conflicting hypotheses on the effects of ownership on enterprise performance to be tested.
Findings based on a unique enterprise panel and fixed effects production function models for
varying time periods during 1993-97 and using different proxies for key variables indicate that:
(i) private ownership is 13-15% more efficient than state ownership; (ii) majority ownership by
foreigners, managers and employees are respectively 19-21%, 15-31% and 13-24% more
productive than state ownership. While the first result supports the standard theory of
privatization, the second result provides stronger support for theorists who argue that insider
ownership may be preferred in some circumstances in transition economies.
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31. Introduction.
In this paper we provide empirical evidence on the key economic issue of which
forms of enterprise ownership are more efficient. The need for more reliable empirical evidence
on this  matter is especially acute in transition economies since most theorists (e.g. Boyck  et al.
1993) argue that the place of state ownership in post communist economies is very limited and
that economic efficiency demands that the vast bulk of firms in the socialized sectors should be
privatized.  The other key topic concerns the preferred ownership structure for privately owned
firms -- whether firms are to be insider or outsider owned and, if insider controlled,  whether the
controlling group are to be managers or workers (Bim et al., 1994). The importance of this issue
has grown enormously since an important feature of the privatization process has been the
largely unexpected growth of widespread insider ownership (Nuti, 1997;Estrin and Wright,
1999). This stylized fact stands in sharp contrast to the implications that emerge from standard
theory. For reasons including easier access to capital markets and ease in solving the agency
problems of governments that try to control firms, the dominant view is that firms with outside
ownership are expected to be more efficient than firms owned by insiders (e.g. Boycko et al.
1996). In addition, primarily because of allegedly providing superior ways of resolving agency
issues within the firm, the most efficient form of insider ownership typically is argued to be
manager (rather than employee) ownership (e.g. Earleet al. 1996).i
The empirical evidence that bears on the effec s of different ownership structures
on enterprise performance for transition economies is growing, with recent valuable by
contributions including Frydman et al. (1999), Earle and Estrin (1998), Pohl et al. (1997), Estrin
and Rosevear (1999) and Buck et al. (1999).  However, as noted by many researchers (e.g.
Aghion and Carlin, (1997);  Estrin and Wright, (1999)), many studies suffer from important
weaknesses, particularly difficulties in obtaining data for large and representative samples of
firms. In addition, most studies have tended to focus only on selected cases (particularly Russia
4and the Visegrad countries) and, in part because of data restrictions, researchers have employed
differing empirical approaches, some of which have well-known weaknesses (e.g. the use of
cross sectional analysis). Unsurprisingly perhaps, in view of these  difficulties, no firm or general
conclusions have yet emerged in this area, though some of the more influential papers provide
empirical evidence that support key propositions of the conventional wisdom.ii
In this paper, in part because we are fortunate to be able to draw on a rich new
panel for more than 600 Estonian firms, we provide evidence that is more robust than much of
the  available evidence. Furthermore, the Estonian case is an especially informative one to
investigate the effects of ownership since, after privatization, diverse patterns of enterprise
ownership soon emerged. Indeed privatization in Estonia resulted not only in the sale of a
number of firms to foreigners and domestic outsiders but also in the creation of insider-owned
enterprises including a significant proportion of employee-owned firms (Jones and Mygind,
1999). By using this large panel to estimate fixed effects production function models, we find
evidence of a privatization effect but only partial support for other propositions associated with
the standard theory of privatization. Stronger support is found for hypotheses that insider
ownership may be preferred in some circumstances in transition economies.
II Conceptual Framework
The theoretical case for privatization rests on several arguments (e.g. Boycko et al..
1996). Besides the alleged need for d politicization, it is argued that only non-state forms of
ownership will produce an environment conducive to nurturing financial discipline in firms. The
alleviation of the woes of state-owned firms would be achieved in several ways.  Unlike state
planners, the dominant goals of privatized firms would be profit maximization or revenue
growth. New owners would introduce more efficient methods for monitoring firm performance.
Private owners would also be expected to bring with them improved technologies and knowhow
5as well as funds for investment in new technology. Privatized firms would be more likely to shed
excess labor as they might be less vulnerable than government-controlled firms to the political
and social consequences of such actions. Wh le not everyone accepts these views, in this section
we accept the need for privatization and a large private sector and instead discuss the arguments
for the preferred form of private ownership.iii
To consider these issues, the dominant approach in the corporate governance
literature classifies firms by ownership (see, e.g. Schleifer & Vishny, 1997). For reasons
including greater ease in raising new capital, it is argued that ownership by outsiders i
preferred. However, it is recognized that new private owners may fail to ensure proper control of
management. For example, mass privatization schemes could lead to diffuse private ownership
by small outside shareholders that often lack the means and incentives to restructure and monitor
firms (Pohl et al., 1997). Therefore concentrated private ownership by outsiders is often argued
to be  the preferred form of privatization.
When insiders dominate, it is argued that the most efficient form of insider
ownership is managerial (rather than worker) ownership  (e.g Boycko et al., 1996). The
conclusion that firms owned by their workers will have inferior economic performance is based
on several arguments.  It is argued that the perceived interests of enterprise workers are likely to
conflict in  important respects with the long-run interests of their enterprise. It is held that
workers will underinvest in capital equipment, that productivity will be low as worker-owners
expend little effort and that layoffs will be resisted. Consequently, the conventional wisdom is
that significant employee ownership will have detrimental effects on enterprise performance and
undermine the ability of newly-privatized firms to undertake meaningful restructuring (Frydman
et al., 1993b). However, there are several reasons why these conclusions may not always be most
appropriate for transition economies and why, in fact, formal economic theory yields no clear cut
predictions concerning the preferred form of ownership.
6             Critics question whether stock markets actually perform their intended functions
effectively, especially in the context of formerly centrally planned economies with very
underdeveloped capital market institutions. Aoki and Kim (1995) note that much of the
traditional analysis assumes an idealized view of advanced market economies and that the
argument for the promotion of outside ownership and efficient securities markets ignores crucial
matters such as inherited factors and assumes competitive product and labor markets. In the
context of transition economies, Earle and  Estrin (1996) also argue that the effects of employee
ownership may be dependent on a host of factors such as market conditions. In particular cases,
some forms of employee ownership may be a feasible solution to the choice of ownership
structure.
More generally, some types of insider-owned structures, can be justified on several
grounds (Ben-Ner, 1993).  Advocates of insider owned and controlled firms argue that such
firms are more likely to be characterized by a focused, tightly-knit, flesh and blood ownership
group with a strong stake in enterprise performance--as compared with the alternative of external
ownership of joint stock companies. In such firms,  t e security and stability of the enterprise and
its work force will weigh more heavily in decision-making. Arguably insider ownership and
insider control is more conducive to enterprise stability and long term employment relationships
and thus may contribute to better economic performance in a number of ways. Also, greater
enterprise stability may encourage more salvaging of still useful capital stock, and it may help to
avoid a cascade of business failures due to the shutdown of one key enterprise in a productive
structure still characterized by an inflexible network of input sources and output outlets.
 The closer alignment of the goals of different economic agents within insider-
owned firms may better motivate workers to join in restructuring efforts and to  b tter use their
accumulated experience and firm-specific knowledge. Ownership by non-managerial employees
(as well as managers) may thus be expected to lead to enhanced productivity and, at some point,
7enterprise success will be reflected in a higher stock price.  In such cases, the interest of the firm
is more aligned with the interest of its employees.  For several reasons, these interest alignm nt
effects can be expected to be more significant in firms in which the precise institutional
arrangements enable broad participation by employees (and are not restricted to executives) and
in which employee ownership constitutes a significant part of the average employees' wealth.iv
III Privatization and Ownership Structures in Estonia
In this section we consider key aspects of the differing legal arrangements and
formal institutional structures (especially  ownership structures) that have emerged in Estonia in
the 1990s.  We give special consideration to employee ownership and privatization.v Compared
to the Russian case (and also those of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), unsurprisingly
not only have the Baltic States in general received much less attention, but also much less is
known about them.vi  What is known is sometimes quite surprising. In Estonia, while initially the
privatization legislation did convey special advantages to employees, best represented by the
nurturing of a handful of "people's enterprises", these advantages were soon ended. Yet
concerning the privatization of small firms,  some advantages were given to employees -- e.g.
through concessional shares. Hence the employee ownership that has emerged apparently has
largely occurred in spite of legislation and a political climate which  mainly had other objectives.
Thus there has been limited use of vouchers and the bulk of the privatization of big firms has
come through mechanisms resembling those used in the former East Germany -- with a
Treuhand-like privatization agency soliciting tenders for state firms. A core investor model has
been encouraged an   foreign ownership has been aggressively and fairly successfully sought.
While the discussion thus far suggests that there are believed to be very different
patterns ofwnership  emerging within Estonia, at the same time, the data available at enterprise
level with which to gauge what is actually happening, have so far been quite limited.vii  To
8provide more reliable information on some of these pr cesses  in this study we make use of a
unique data set. With the cooperation of the central statistical authority in Estonia, annual
economic and financial data were extracted from company records for a random sample of 666
firms for 1993-1997 to construct a rich panel. To complement these standard economic data,
including profits, sales, assets and  employment,  special ownership surveys were undertaken. In
these, detailed  data on the distribution of ownership for insiders, available separately for
managers and employees, and outsiders, split into foreigners and domestic outsiders, and the
state were collected for this large panel. By selecting a large sample, we expect to have
representation of all the main forms of ownership, as well as firms which had been privatized or
started from scratch at different times and firms from a broad range of  industries.viii
These data enable not only estimation of diverse specifications, but also
construction of measures of key variables. Concerning ownership, most previous studies of
transition economies which investigate the impact of different forms of privatization upon
economic performance, have used measures of which group is the largest or the dominant
shareholder (Frydman et. al., 1997; Jones, 1998; Earle et. al.,1996). They have proceeded this
way since classifications based on majority ownership would have led to the vast bulk of firms
being designated as “no-majority”.  Fortunately, in most cases in Estonia, we are able to classify
firms based on the analytically preferable method of majority ownership.  While dispersed
shareholdings within a category may lead to limited cohesiveness by the largest ownership
group, this problem is likely to be more acute in classifications based on dominant ownership
which may account for as little as 25% of the total voting stock.
 The descriptive statistics for the whole sample are reported in Table 1; variable
definitions are given in the Appendix.ix  All financial data are denominated in thousands of real
1993 Estonian kroons ($1=approximately 12-14 kroons). Using a 50% benchmark for majority
ownership, importantly it is evident that the transition in Estonia resulted in a simple majority in
9almost all  firms. In 1993, 42.3% of the firms were state-owned. Foreigners controlled 14.7% of
the firms, domestic outsiders owned 17.7% while insiders had a majority stake in 24% of the
firms, with managers controlling11.4% and employees 12.4%. Only 1.4% of the firms did not
have a simple majority.
The comparison of the data for 1993 and 1997 show a great degree of change in
ownership configurations. The proportion of firms in which the state had a majority stake
declined to 21.3% as privatization continued. While the fraction of enterprises with a foreign
majority stayed about the same, domestic outsiders and managers increased their shares to 28.1%
and 20.5%, respectively. The percentage of firms with an employee majority declined somewhat
to 10.1%. There were still few firms with no majority (3.3% of the sample).
Transition is seen to have had a negative impact on real sales and employment but
not on real fixed assets and real energy and fuel consumption (Table 1).x Moreover, the analysis
indicates significant differences between ownership groups (Table 2). In particular, state-owned
firms have significantly higher real sales, real fixed assets, real fuel and energy consumption, and
employment than private firms. For example, in 1997, firms with state majority had average real
fixed assets of 25,735,000 kroons and employment of 301 whereas private firms had real sales of
7,084,000 kroons and employed 100 on average. Clearly, firms that remained state-owned retain
some features of the larger firms of the socialist era.
Within the private sector, insider-owned firms have smaller real sales and real fixed
assets than outsider-owned firms. Except for 1995, a comparable observation applies to energy
and fuel consumption. By contrast, insider owners employ similar number of workers as do firms
in which outsiders own a majority of the equity, with the exception of 1997. By focussing solely
on employee ownership, we see that there are mixed results for all relevant variables. In
particular, employee-owned firms do not seem to be undercapitalized relative to manager-
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controlled firms but are definitely smaller both in terms of real fixed assets and energy and fuel
consumption than firms with an outsider majority.
IV Estimating Framework and Results
 In designing our empirical strategy, we note that there are relatively few
hypothesis-testing studies on the effect of ownership structures on enterprise behavior for former
communist countries. Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches. The most frequent type
of econometric study to date employs diverse single indicators of economic performance which
are explained by using models in which the key variable is either a privatization dummy or a set
of dummy variables for different ownership structures (e.g. Earl  and Estrin, 1996).  Most often
cross sectional regressions are estimated by using OLS though, to deal with potential problems
of endogeneity, sometimes instrumental variable methods are used.  Reviews of studies hich
adopt this empirical strategy do not reveal any consistent findings on the effects of ownership.
Frydman et al, (1997), adopt another approach that is broadly comparable insofar
as they too attempt to model a single indicator of performance, such as the change in the labor
force or labor productivity. However, by measuring all key variables in privatization (rather than
in calendar)  time, including a control for inherited  pre-privatization differences in performance,
and measuring average performance over a period of time (rather than for a single year),  their
work makes significant innovations. In some regressions the coefficient on a privatization
dummy measures the performance effect specific to privatized firms  wher as in other
specifications a set of dummies for the largest owner (different forms of privatization) are
included instead of the privatization dummy  variable. Importantly, in their empirical work,
which pools data for 1990-1993 for a sample of 185 firms in Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, strong evidence is found of privatization effects, and that the most efficient forms of
privatization are outsider-owned and that firms owned by employees are the least efficient.
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However, the adoption of a similar approach for other countries has not yielded comparably firm
conclusions.xi
 These empirical strategies have been developed partly in response to the unusual
difficulties that confront applied researchers in transition countries–for example, the large
measurement errors in key variables such as capital. However, a potential criticism of these
innovative strategies is that much of this work is not grounded in well-established conceptual
frameworks. Partially in response to these difficulties,  in examining the effects of privatization
upon enterprise performance, another method has begun to appear (e.g. Smith et al. 1997, Pohl et
al., 1997; Jones and Mygind, 1999). This approach is derived from a standard empirical strategy
in the literature for western firms, namely the estimation of production functions. Indeed there is
a huge literature that has examined diverse matters concerning the effects of ownership for firms
in western countries.xii  This intellectual pedigree argument as well as a strong sense that the
quality of the Estonian data is quite high, leads us to use a production function approach in this
paper.
In estimating the impact of various ownership structures on productive efficiency,
we therefore estimate equations of the general form:
Q = F(K, L, H, Z)                                     (1)
where Q denotes a measure of output, K and L are a measure of total capital stock and total
employment; H is a vector of variables representing the effects of  ownership structures;  and Z
is a vector of control variables such as industry and labor quality.  To see how the ownership
variables enter equation (1) consider the Cobb Douglas case when the effects of ownership
structures are disembodied. In logarithmic form this becomes:
lnQit =   $5 lnKit  + $ L lnLit  +  Ei (iHit  + Ei *iZit  +  "i    +  J i    + µit                       (2)
Since the data are quite rich, often we ar   able to use different proxies for key
variables. For example,  and unlike many other studies of transition economies, our measures of
12
enterprise  production are the conceptually preferable value added, as well as sales. For capital,
not only do we use a measure of fixed assets, but also,  following the literature for transition
economies (e.g. Pohl et al., (1998) we also employ a measure of energy use as a surrogate for
capital use. In our basic regressions ownership is simply represented by a dummy variable for
whether or not the firms is ajority state owned. In subsequent regressions this single dummy
variable is replaced by a vector of fou majority ownership (with the base case being majority
state owned). To examine hypotheses concerning the effect of concentrated ownership on firm
performance, we create a single dummy variable, Anymaj, for whether or not the firm has (any)
majority owner group.  Note that in the regressions that focus on the effects of different majority
ownership structures, firms without a clear majority are omitted form the reported findings. For
control variables, Z, always our data allow us to include industry dummies, and one or more
dummies that capture an important regional dimension (e.g. in Estonia, location in Tallinn or
otherwise).
Another important aim of our analysis is to identify the most appropriate form of
the production function, in case the effects attributed to the ownership variables when a single
functional form is imposed are in fact due to misspecification of technology. We therefore
estimate diverse specifications and, after estimating forms including the generalized Cobb-
Douglas and translog production functions, the production function that is best supported by the
data is selected  on the basis of appropriate test statistics.
Key findings are contai ed in  Tables 3-4. In these reported regressions,  the
dependent variable is always  the natural logarithm of real sales. Whereas in Table 3  real fixed
assets are used as a measure of capital,  real energy and fuel consumption are used in the
regressions reported in Table 4. In both sets of estimates, translog specifications are reported as
they are preferred at the 1% l vel. Also, firm fixed effects are always found to be significant at
the 1% level.
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The main finding that emerges from Table 3 is that, after controlling for firm-
specific effects, strong evidence is found that ownership helps to account for differences in
productivity. Moreover, the magnitudes of ownership effects are at reasonable levels.xiii In
particular, the coefficient on Majpriv in Specification 1 is positive and significant, indicating that
firms with a private majority outperform state firms by 15.2%.
Turning to the second specification in Table 3, an important finding is that  the null
hypothesis that the joint effect of the majority ownership variables is zero is rejected at the 1%
level. In terms of the impact of different ownership configurations, we see that  firms in which
there is a majority foreign owner (Majfor) have a 21.2% edge over state firms. As such this
finding corroborates results from other studies (e.g. Frydman et al., 1999). However, the
Estonian results also indicate that there are other forms of private ownership that outperform the
base case of state ownership. Most interestingly, both forms of insider ownership are also found
to be statistically significantly (at the 1% level) more productive than are state firms. Moreover,
the effects are quite large, though not unrealistically so. Firms in which  anagers have majority
ownership outperform state firms by 31.2%. As such, from 1993 to 1997, managerial ownership
is the most productive form of private ownership, outperforming ev n  foreign owned firms.
Firms in which non-managerial owners are the main owners also do very well. Employee owned
firms are found to be 24% more productive  than state owned firms; also, they perform 3% better
than do firms in which foreigners are the majority owners. xiv
In other regressions, the exercises reported in Table 3 are replicated but alternative
proxies for key variables are used. In the main the key findings remain unaltered when these
alternative specifications are estimated. Thus in Table 4 findings are reported when real energy
and fuel consumption is used as an alternative surrogate for capital.xv Again we find that the
translog specification is preferred to Cobb-Douglas at the 1% level. From specification 3 we see
that the coefficient on Majpriv is positive and statistically significant indicating that privatization
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is a more efficient form of business organization than is state ownership. Again we see that three
forms of majority ownership -- by foreigners, managers and employees--are found to be more
productive than state ownership. Again we find that the hypothesis that domestic outside
ownership delivers enhanced business performance is not supported by the findings for Estonia.
In some cases the size of the effects is essentially unaltered by the use of a different
measure of capital. Thus the results for specification 3 suggest that private firms have a 13%
edge over state owned firms (this compares with a 15% effect in specification 1  reported in
Table 3). Also the impact of foreign ownership on enterprise productivity is about the same in
specifications 2 and 4. However, the size of the effects of majority ownership by managers and
employees, while still strongly positive,  are not nearly as great in specification 4 as in model 2.
In turn, the findings in Table 4 indicate that the most efficient form of private ownership is
ownership by foreigners (for example, these findings suggest that foreign ownership utperforms
manager (insider) ownership by 4%).xvi
V. Conclusions
In this paper we use Estonian data to investigate the effects of ownership on firm
performance. In Estonia, while privatization and new start ups has led to the emergence of a
significant number of firms in which foreigners and domestic outsiders own the majority of
shares,  a large number of firms that are owned by insiders also exist. Also, some firms that
continue to be state-owned. These heterogeneous ownership structures mean that Estonia is a
particularly apt case for the empirical analysis of ownership issues. Our empirical work is based
on new enterprise-level data that are especially rich in details of ownership structures and which
we have collected during annual surveys over a five y ar period.  By using this large panel and a
fixed effects production function framework, we provide some of the most rigorous findings for
a transition economy on the effects of ownership on business performance to date.
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Estimates for the period 1993-1997 (when capital is measured using a measure of
fixed assets) indicate that: (i) private ownership is about 15% more efficient than state
ownership; (ii) the null hypothesis that the joint effect of the majority ownership variables on
productivity is zero is rejected at the 1% level; (iii) majority ownership by foreigners, managers
and employees are respectively 21%, 31% and 24% more productive than state ownership; by
contrast, majority ownership by domestic outsiders has no discernible impact on business
performance. In the main these findings are corroborated when different proxies for key
variables are used (and sometimes data for a shorter time period are used). Thus, estimates for
the period 1995-97 (using a measure of energy and fuel use to proxy capital)  confirm the second
and fourth findings reported above and also suggest that domestic ownership has no impact on
firm productivity. They also support the other findings although the magnitude of the effects
usually falls. Thus private ownership is found to be about 13% (rather than 15%) more efficient
than state ownership. Majority ownership by foreigners, managers and employees are
respectively 19%, 15% and 13% more productive than state ownership.
Thus our findings for Estonia strongly confirm the hypothesis that privatization
will be accompanied by gains in economic efficiency. As such, this findings corroborated those
for other transition countries for the Visegrad countries which are usually based on earlier data
and which use alternative empirical strategies notably Frydman et al. (1999). Moreover, the size
of the privatization effect is comparable to that found in these other studies (e.g. Pohl, 1997).The
finding of this strong evidence of a privatization effect for a country other than those in Central
and Eastern Europe is important since many studies for Russia and CIS countries (e.g. Estrin and
Rosevear (1999)  for Ukraine; Jones (1998) for Russia) do not find evidence that private
ownership improves economic performance. These sharply differing cross-national findings
point to the importance of factors other than privatization per se in accounting for successful
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business performance. An important task of future research is to uncover these other
determinants of business performance.
So far as the impact of specific forms of ownership are concerned our findings are
quite different than other influential studies. For example, unlike Frydma  et al. (1999) we find
that insider ownership can be not only more productive than state ownership but also that types
of insider ownership can rank amongst the most effective forms of private ownership.  As such
our findings support those who predict the beneficial effects of insider ownership in some
transition economies.  Thus our findings on firms that are employee owned are consistent with
hypotheses that employee ownership is expected to produce more interest alignment and more
involvement of employees and, in turn, better organizational performance (compared to majority
ownership by outsiders as well as state ownership). In turn these results thus provide only partial
support for the standard theory of privatization and stronger support for theorists who argue that
insider ownership may be preferred in some circumstances in transition economies. The results
are especially persuasive since our findings are based on firms with dissimilar ownership
structures within an economy that is fairly homogeneous. By contrast, studies of transition
countries which have tended to find that firms with substantial insider ownership perform poorly,
have sometimes relied on pooling data from firms with different ownership structures from
different countries. More generally our findings on the effectiveness of employee ownership
square with those for western economies.  More generally, our findings point, as many have
argued (e.g. Murrell, 1991) to the dangers both of theory and policy that seek to promot
universal prescriptions for transition economies.
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Appendix
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics: Means (Standard Deviations) for the Entire Sample
Year      1993            1994            1995            1996            1997
Rsale
Rfa
Emp
Renergy
Majsta
Majpriv
Majfor
Majdom
Majman
    18880          17241          16471          14905          17431
   (65762)       (56534)        (54136)       (52232)        (59614)
    8811            7297            7831            8416            9794
  (46170)        (37716)       (40475)        (41801)       (47719)
    152              138              129              135              130
   (514)           (461)            (420)           (486)            (420)
                                            1168            1228            1505
                                           (6396)          (7001)        (12062)
      279             256             243              162             110
   (42.3%)       (38.8%)      (36.5%)       (27.4%)      (21.3%)
      381             404             423              430             406
   (57.7%)      (61.2%)      (63.5%)      (72.6%)       (78.7%)
      97               100             96                89               86
   (14.7%)      (15.2%)      (14.4%)      (15.0%)       (16.7%)
      117             127            144              155             145
   (17.7%)      (19.2%)      (21.6%)      (26.2%)      (28.1%)
      75               79              83                94               106
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Table 2  Descriptive Statistics: Means (Standard Deviations) by Ownership
Year
Majority
    1993    1994    1995    1996 1997
state Rsale 31162 25905 23662 28740 41188
Rfa 15752 12371 12137 16836 25735
Emp 234 207 208 246 301
Renergy N/A. N/A. 2367 3222 6794
N 279 256 243 162 125
foreign Rsale 13158
(29820)
18743
(35574)
28263
(54404)
21257
(40004)
26414
(45724)
Rfa 4372
(15590)
9709
(31477)
16001
(37965)
17353
(38697)
18628
(47065)
Emp 41
(77)
59
(105)
70
(106)
98
(143)
92
(135)
Renergy N/A. N/A. 1280 1378 1754
N 97 100 96 89 92
domestic Rsale 10991 12659 12220 12634 13861
outsiders Rfa 4769 3665 5024 5648 6136
Emp 128 119 111 129 134
Renergy N/A. N/A. 506 752 746
N 117 127 144 155 155
managers Rsale 5442 5327 5732 7698 6876
Rfa 651 727 1382 2318 2459
Emp 71 72 63 107 80
Renergy N/A. N/A. 215 358 368
N 75 79 83 94 111
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Table 2 Continued
Year
Majority
    1993     1994 1995 1996 1997
other Rsale 7227 6789 8289 5670 7454
employees Rfa 1726 1549 1924 1819 2336
Emp 111 101 127 88 83
Renergy N/A. N/A. 494 438 536
N 83 88 74 71 55
no majority Rsale 14555
(29821)
14449
(27966)
5330
(7975)
4053
(6746)
7535
(9103)
Rfa 3821
(6818)
3680
(6802)
765
(759)
828
(911)
1424
(1985)
Emp 157
(243)
152
(249)
28
(21)
21
(19)
59
(68)
Renergy N/A. N/A. 143 58 275
N 9 10 26 21 18
private Rsale 9708 11485 12937 11550 13433
Rfa 3134 4148 5696 6306 7084
Emp 92 92 90 106 100
Renergy N/A. N/A. 564 699 798
N 381 404 423 430 431
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Table 3 Fixed-Effects Estimates for 1993-1997
Dependent Variable: LnRsale
Variables                           Specification 1      Specification 2
LnRfa
LnRfasqr
LnEmp
LnEmpsqr
LnRfaEmp
Majpriv
Majfor
Majdom
Majman
Majemp
            -.0073                     -.0054
            (.0626)                    (.0625)
.0018                      .0017
            (.0052)                    (.0052)
              .7764*                     .7633*
            (.1184)                    (.1185)
            -.0344***               -.034***
            (.0189)                    (.0188)
             .036**                     .0361**
            (.0152)                    (.0152)
             .1519**
            (.0641)
                                             .2123**
                                            (.1005)
                                             .064
                                            (.0717)
                                             .3123*
                                            (.0826)
                                             .2441*
                                            (.0899)
Notes:
1. Rfa is used as a proxy for capital.
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
3. * denotes significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 10% level
4. In specifications 1 and 2, the omitted variable is Majsta.
5. In Specification 3, the omitted variable is Nomaj.
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6. The translog specification is preferred at the 5% level.
7. The inclusion of all ownership dummies in Specification 2 is significant at the 1% level
[ F(5, 1830)=4.26].
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Table 4 Fixed-Effects Estimates for 1995-1997
Dependent Variable: LnRsale
Variables                           Specification 3     Specification 4
LnRenergy
LnRenergysqr
LnEmp
LnEmpsqr
LnRenergyEmp
Majpriv
Majfor
Majdom
Majman
Majemp
           .4042*                       .4075*
          (.091)                         (.0914)
           .0364*                       .0359*
          (.0093)                       (.0094)
           .362***                     .3596***
          (.2151)                       (.2165)
           .0947*                       .0943*
          (.0323)                       (.0325)
          -.1121*                     -.1119*
          (.0262)                       (.0262)
           .1302***
          (.0722)
                                             .1944***
                                            (.1194)
                                             .1037
                                            (.0779)
                                             .1544***
                                            (.095)
                                             .1399***
                                            (.0803)
Notes:
1. Renergy is used as a proxy for capital.
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
3. *-significant at the 1% level; **-at the 5% level; ***-at the 10% level.
4. In specifications 1 and 2, the omitted variable is Majsta.
5. In specification 3, the omitted variable is Nomaj.
6. The F-test showed that the translog specification is preferred to Cobb--Douglas at the
1% level [ F(3, 811)=6.79].
7. The inclusion of all ownership dummies in Specification 2 is significant at the 5% level
23
Variable Definitions
Dependent Variable
LnRsale- natural logarithm of real sales
Explanatory Variables
Labor and Capital
LnRfa- natural logarithm of real fixed assets
LnEmp- natural logarithm of employment
LnRfasqr- square of LnRfa
LnEmpsqr- square of LnEmp
LnRfaEmp- product of LnRfa and LnEmp
LnRenergy- natural logarithm of real energy and fuel consumption
LnRenergysqr- square of LnRenergy
LnRenergyEmp- product of LnRenergy and LnEmp
Ownership
Majsta-1 if the state has a majority stake in a firm, 0 otherwise
Majpriv- 1 if private ownership groups have a majority stake in a firm, 0 otherwise
Majfor-1 if foreigners have a majority stake in a firm, 0 otherwise
Majdom-1 if domestic outsiders have a majority stake in a firm, 0 otherwise
Majman-1 if managers have a majority stake in a firm, 0 otherwise
Majemp-1 if other employees have a majority stake in a firm, 0 otherwise
Nomaj-1 if no ownership group has a majority stake in a firm, 0 otherwise
Anymaj- 1 if any ownership group has a majority stake in a firm, 0 otherwise
Control Variables
Year Dummies
Firm Dummies
Industry Dummies (x8)
24
Tallinn (a regional dummy)
Note:
Nominal sales are deflated using the CPI (1993 base year). The capital stock is deflated using
the PPI.
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Notes
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iHowever, as we discuss later, in fact theory is more ambiguous on some of these matters.
ii In particular see Frydman et al. (1999) and Pohl et al. (1997). However, for reviews that are
less supportive of the conventional wisdom see Estrin and Wright (1999) and C rlin and
Landesman,  (1997).
iiiAlso there is  empirical evidence which suggests that the issue is not as clear cut as proponents
believe. Thus for Poland see Pinto et al.. 1993 and for Russia,  Jones (1998 ).
iv In addition powerful complementarities may be expected to exist when employee participation
accompanies employee control. Goal alignment effects of  employee participation  (e.g. small
group activities) are more subtle (but not necessarily weaker) than effects through ownership.
Small group activities may provide valuable opportunities for both management and labor to
learn about each other in a cooperative atmosphere and thus develop stronger trust.  With
stronger trust, sharing vital business information with labor will help convince labor that it is in
their interest to improve productivity and firm performance. Various forms of employee
participation may play an important role of providing employees a voice in the firm and thus
reduce the costs of exit from the firm, saving specific human capital.
v Our account draws heavily on  (Mygind, 1999). We do not consider the fading days of
communism and, for example, attempts at reform by leasing. On this see Frydman et al. 1993.
vi For broader discussions of Estonia see World Bank (1993) and Jones and Mygind (1998).
vii For example, the pioneering study of privatization by Frydman et al. (1993) does not contain
much enterprise-level information.
viii8. Thus we include some firms that were never privatized and also some privatized firms in
which the state remained the majority owner during the period of study.
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ixMainly because of missing values, the precise number of observations that can be used for
estimation each year is less then 600.
x Many of these differences are statistically significant (using paired t tests).
xi For the case of Russia see Jones (1998). For Kyrgystan see..Roberts??.....
xii.. By using a panel  we can control for time-invariant, firm fixed effects. In particular, there
may be some firm characteristics such as superior organization, location or better quality of
labor force whose effect is only partially explained by industry and region dummies in cross-
sectional analysis.  Studies which have adopted this approach when examining the impact of
ownership on firm performance see, for example, Svejnar et al. (199X)–EER,  Jones and Kato,
1995 and J Finance study. For reviews see Kruse (1999).
xiii These coefficient estimates are much more reasonable than those obtained from cross-
sectional analysis. Compare for example with Jones and Mygind (1999).
xiv An F test of the joint hypothesis that all privatization  coefficients are equal is rejected at the
5% level.
xvNote that, because energy data are not available for earlier years, the model is estimated for a
shorter time period, namely 1995-1997.
xvi We also replicated the models reported in table 3 but using value added  as an alternative
measure of productivity.  We choose to report findings using sales because many firm had ither
tiny or negative value added. In the logarithm models that are estimated this then leads to a
censoring of observations. In any event, the estimates using value added do not produce a
dramatic effect on the findings reported in Tables 3-4. For example, estimation of specification
1 reduces the sample size to 1825. However, again we find that there is a privatization effect
that is statistically significant (the size of the effect is about 22%). When the privatization
dummy is replaced by dummies for types of majority ownership (model 2) the ranking of best
performing forms of ownership does not change and all three individual forms of ownership
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continue to be statistically significant.  These and other regression results are available from the
authors upon request.
